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ABSTRACT
Making Choices Real: Increasing Electoral 
Participation By Voting for None
by
Shanna S. Phillips
Dr. Timothy Fackler, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Political Science 
University of Nevada. Las Vegas
W hile Nevada legislators have consistently changed Nevada’s election 
laws in order to keep up with the advance o f modem society, there are several 
problems with Nevada’s election rules. I intend to discuss reforms that could 
increase the effectiveness of the “none o f these candidates’* law in Nevada.
First, I w ill assess the need for a binding “none of these candidates” law since the 
1970’s. I w ill track patterns of electoral participation so that I can assess the 
impact o f Nevada’s electoral laws on the voters of our state. Next, I w ill define 
the problems with Nevada's electoral structure and address the theoretical 
reasons that make a binding version o f “none of these candidates” necessary, i 
w ill conclude by addressing different ways to get a binding version o f the “none of 
these candidates” law adopted in Nevada and throughout the United States.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
While Nevada legislators have consistently changed Nevada's election 
laws in order to keep up with the advance of modem society, there are several 
problems with Nevada's election rules. I w ill demonstrate that we have reached 
a critical juncture in Nevada's history where a small change could significantly 
improve our electoral system. This is not to say that the current system is 
inherently flawed, but instead that our system could be improved in a way that 
would make it more democratic.
Research Questions 
I intend to discuss a reform that could increase the effectiveness of 
Nevada's electoral system. The binding “none o f these candidates” option that I 
propose w ill act as a partial solution to Nevada’s poor tumout and lack of trust in 
public officiais. There are a host o f proposals fo r campaign finance reform, term 
lim its and other types o f reform that can be discussed with reference to each 
specific problem that t w ill address, but a binding “none o f these candidates” law 
is the only single piece of legislation that can bring us one step closer to solving 
all o f these problems simultaneously. The binding “none o f these candidates" 
law cannot solve a ll o f Nevada's problems, but it is certainty a step in the right
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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direction. Nevada’s current “none o f the above" statute is impotent when dealing 
with these issues because it is not binding on the players that it seeks to restrain, 
but a binding version o f the statute offers some hope for improvement The 
current law exists as only a token reform that has little impact on which candidate 
is elected to office.
In the following chapter, I w ill assess the need for a binding “none of these 
candidates" law since the 1970’s by framing the issue in the context in which it 
was originally adopted. I w ill further explain the nuances o f the existing law and 
the changes that a binding “none of these candidates” law would make. In the 
second chapter, I w ill define the problems with Nevada’s electoral structure and 
address the theoretical reasons that make a binding version o f “none of these 
candidates” necessary. I w ill also elaborate on specific problems caused by 
Nevada’s electoral procedures and discuss how this reform could improve the 
effectiveness o f Nevada’s electoral process. Chapter three w ill discuss specific 
vices that contribute to electoral problems and methods that a binding version of 
“none o f these candidates” would employ to control these vices. I w ill conclude 
by addressing different ways to get a binding version of the “none o f these 
candidates” law adopted in Nevada and throughout the United States.
Purpose o f the Study 
Careful analysis o f an existing law requires more than just a reading o f the 
statute. We have to consider the context in which laws were made and the 
problems that these laws sought to address in order to fu lly appreciate the intent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
of existing legislation. It is easy for us to understand the motivation o f a legislator 
when a problem is resolved, but existing laws that have not successfully resolved 
problems are still worthy o f academic analysis. Through the analysis and 
refinement of unsuccessful laws, we uncover strategies to change those laws so 
that they become successful in achieving their goals. The “none of these 
candidates” law fits well within the boundaries o f this category. While “none of 
these candidates” has not successfully resolved the problem of distrust that it 
sought to redress, this legislation is worthy of academic analysis because review 
of the law may lead to the development o f reforms that can accomplish the goals 
of the existing legislation.
In the midst o f the Watergate scandal, the Nevada legislature adopted the 
“none of these candidates” law to increase trust fo r public officials. The act was 
passed to smooth over differences between elected officials and their 
constituents during a time when contempt for politicians was rampant. The law 
required that “none o f these candidates” must appear below the list o f candidate 
names in every statewide race. Legisiators thought that they could earn back the 
public's trust by adopting an unprecedented policy that demonstrated the 
worthiness of the government establishment.
When state assemblyman Don Mello first proposed the “none o f these 
candidates” law, the Las Veaas Sun printed an editorial boasting that “it is 
entirely possible that in one simple stroke, Mello h it upon a scheme that w ill do 
more to bring about economy and efficiency in office than all the ̂ ncy election
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reform proposals combined” (“Frustrated Voters,” 1975)/ Unfortunately, the 
merits o f the bill were soon compromised by two sacrifices that were made to 
secure its adoption. The “none of these candidates” law challenged the public to 
vote fo r “none of the above” when candidates are not worthy of public office, but 
the state assembly ensured that the public would not take full advantage of the 
legislation by amending the bill to include a clause stating that “none of these 
candidates" can never win an election (Journal o f the Assemblv. 1975).̂  This 
amendment changed the legislation so that “none o f these candidates” acted as 
an actual candidate solely for documentation purposes without changing the 
results of the election. After amending the bill, the assembly voted 34 to 3 in 
favor o f its adoption.^ While this concession had to be made in order to secure a 
majority vote, Mello’s original legislation provided for a more equitable solution 
for voters who choose “none of the above” instead o f another candidate.
Adoption in the Nevada senate required further concessions to be made. 
After the first reading o f the bill, senators voted to “indefinitely postpone” 
consideration of the bill, but the measure was reconsidered a week later when 
Chairman Gibson o f the Senate Government Affairs Committee noted that “there 
was no representation from the sponsors of the bill” (Minutes of Senate Meetings 
30 and 3 3 .1975).* The attending senators voted unanimously to reconsider the
 ̂“Frustrated Voters May Get a Choice," Las Vegas Sun. 12 March 1975.
 ̂Nevada General Assembly, Journal of the Assembly. Fifty-eighth Session, 26 March 
1975 (Carson City, 1975), 454-455.
 ̂Nevada General Assembly, Journal of the Assembly. Fifty-eighth Session, 26 March 
1975 (Carson City, 1975), 111,489. Two members of the assembly were absent at the time that 
the vote was taken. Another member was present, but refused to vote on the bill.
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bill in the absence o f its sponsors. The only debate that took place in the senate 
dealt with whether the “none of these candidates” law should apply to elected 
judges and local officials. The senate amended the legislation to apply only to 
statewide offices (including seats in the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of 
Representatives) and the bill was sent back to the assembly for approval. There 
is little  doubt that Nevada senators created the statewide office limitation to avoid 
running against “none o f these candidates” in the next election. Legislators 
adopted the current “none of these candidates” law as a symbolic, token reform 
to enhance public relations without endangering their likelihood for reelection. 
They watered down the law because they wanted the public to vote them back 
into office in the next election.
Nevada is currently the only state that gives voters the option of choosing 
“none of these candidates” in every statewide race, but there are two serious 
problems with Nevada's law. First, Nevada’s law is not binding in cases where 
“none of these candidates” wins the election. Nevada’s “none o f these 
candidates” law is the equivalent of a vote for a losing candidate because it does 
not change the results o f the election. In two elections immediately following 
Nevada’s 1976 adoption of the “none of these candidates” law, both of Nevada’s 
Republican congressional primaries were won by “none of these candidates.” In 
the four cases where “none o f the above” has won a statewide primary election,
*  Nevada Senate, Government Affiaîrs Committee, Minutes of Meeting No. 30—Aorit 10. 
1975. (Carson City, 1975), 2.
Nevada Senate, Govemment Affiairs Committee, Minutes of Meeting No. 33—Aorii 17. 
1975. (Carson City, 1975), 2.
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the second place candidates were still given the victory/ “Its  as if the second- 
place finisher at this years Olympic games was awarded the Gold Medal,” 
commented the Wall Street Journal (1996)/
Next, Nevada’s law does not mandate the appearance of “none of these 
candidates” in every political race. Since the state gained a second 
congressional seat in 1980, “none of these candidates” no longer appears on any 
of Nevada’s congressional ballots. The “none of these candidates” option also 
does not appear next to candidate names in the bulk o f Nevada’s political races 
because o f the “statewide office” lim itation. In 1996, there were only fourteen 
statewide offices, but there were sixty-five local offices.̂  Even though terms for 
these offices are staggered so that we w ill never vote for all seventy-nine offices
 ̂“None of these candidates” (16,097 votes) won the 1976 republican congressional 
primary against Anthony Dart (8,097) and Walden Charles Earhart (9,831). Earhart was awarded 
the republican nomination for the office of U.S. Representative, but he lost the general election to 
democratic incumbent congressman Jim Santini. “None of these candidates” (18,383) beat 
Earhart (16,599) again in the republican primary for secretary of state in 1978. George Cotton 
(9,168) also lost to “none of these candidates” in the 1978 republican primary for secretary of 
state. Earhart was awarded the victory, but he lost the general election race to the incumbent 
secretary of state William D. Swackhamer. During the 1978 republican primary, “none of these 
candidates” (15,441) also beat three candidates for the office of republican congressman—Bill 
O'Mara (14,610), Martin Hoffenblum (2,982) and Sam Cavnar (13,102). O’Mara was awarded the 
victory in the primary, but he lost the congressional race to incumbent congressman Jim Santini 
in the general election. The only victory for “none of these candidates” in a democratic primary 
occurred in the 1986 race for state treasurer when “none of these candidates” (19,891) beat five 
other candidates running for the office. Patrick M. FitzPatrick (18,389) was awarded the victory 
against Nadean Reed (15,245), John Chrissinger (13,065), Stan Knight (8,498) and Harold L  
Singer (6,710) in the primary, but republican Ken Santor beat FitzPatrick in the general election.
° “Give Voters a Real Choice,” in the W all Street Joumal. par. 1 [Lkd. What is Binding 
None o f the Above?! (3 June 1996 [cited 10 February 1999]); available from World Wide Web @ 
httDVyWww.nader96.ora/Wsi.htm
 ̂For the purposes of this paper, local offices will refer only to those offices listed in 
Secretary of State Dean Heller's Political History of Nevada 1996. These offices include two 
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, eleven members of the Board of Regents, eleven 
members of the State Board of Education, and forty-one district judges.
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in one election, local offices constitute the bulk of the offices on the ballot in any 
election.
The intentions of state assemblyman Don Mello were noble even though 
these compromises led to an ineffective, token reform. In spite o f numerous 
political scandals, elected officials wanted to demonstrate that they were worthy 
of being trusted without actually putting their jobs on the line. The law 
exemplifies the power of the public to make legislators feel that they need to 
prove their integrity, but the law did not carry enough weight to achieve its 
primary objective because it is not binding on candidates when “none of these 
candidates” wins a plurality o f the votes. While there is some merit to the 
legislatures argument that “none of these candidates" is not an actual candidate 
and therefore cannot hold public office, there is another option called binding 
“none o f the above.”
Definition o f Terms 
“None of the above” (NOTA) can occur in two forms: binding and non­
binding. A non-binding version of “none of these candidates” offers voters the 
option o f choosing NOTA on the ballot, but awards the victory to the second 
place candidate when NOTA wins the race. In this scenario, it is possible to help 
the person you like the least (the second place candidate) win the election by 
voting fo r NOTA instead o f voting fo r the lesser o f two evils. This is the version 
o f “none o f these candidates” that we have in Nevada. A  binding version o f 
NOTA offers voters the option o f choosing NOTA on the ballot, but it does not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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declare the second place candidate the winner in the event that NOTA wins the 
election. Instead o f giving the victory to a candidate that did not win a plurality of 
the votes, the binding version of NOTA forces the state to hold a special election 
to fill the vacancy within one month o f the original election. Candidates that lose 
to NOTA in the first election are not eligible to have their names on the ballot in 
the special election. Losing candidates are ineligible because the voters have 
already chosen not to elect those candidates to public office.
One popular variation of the “none of these candidates” law Is called 
preferential “none o f the above.” Preferential NOTA can be used by states that 
employ either the binding or non-binding versions o f the “none of these 
candidates” law. The preferential method allows voters three options: (1) only 
select their favored candidate, (2) only select “none o f the above” or (3) select 
“none o f the above” in conjunction with a candidate name so that votes are not 
wasted in cases where NOTA fails to win the election. Caltfomia’s None o f the 
Above Voter Empowerment Act would have allowed the use of preferential 
NOTA, but it failed to secure a majority vote in the March 2000 election. NOTA 
advocates estimate that organizations in as many as fifteen states are 
considering initiatives to get preferential “none of the above” on the ballot (Wood, 
1997).® “This flavor o f NOTA would not force you to throw away your vote to 
express dissatis^ction,” says Washington state NOTA advocate John Murray,
“ Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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“you can vote for a candidate and also say you'd rather have ‘none of the above’" 
(1999)/
While election software upgrades would be necessary to count multiple 
votes, preferential NOTA advocates feel that the cost o f upgrading the counting 
and reporting systems In various states would be outweighed by the benefits of 
the new ballot option. Critics often point to the costs of a special election and the 
lack of high quality candidates as their primary objections to NOTA. While it is 
true that an additional election would cost taxpayers more money, the extra 
money would be well spent if citizens were rewarded with good govemment 
“None of these candidates” has won four primary elections since Its adoption in 
1976, but plurality rules did not apply to those races because the second place 
candidates were awarded the political offices in those races. A special election 
due to NOTA would not be any more costly than run-off elections paid for in other 
states when no candidate receives a majority of the votes. Eleven states held 
run-off elections in 1998 because candidates did noteam at least 51% of the 
popular vote. The extra election did not cause undue economic hardship in 
these states. Instead, the run-off election provided citizens with an extra 
opportunity to forge a consensus about which candidate was favored among the 
populace.
NOTA operates on the same principal. When “none o f these candidates" 
places higher than the other candidates for political office, a special election is
 ̂John R. Murray, “An Alternate from Washington State,” [Lkd. Voters for “None of the 
Above”! [cited 2 July 1999!; available from Worid Wide Web @  
http://heD.phvsics.wisc.edu/inb/nota altemate html
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held to determine which candidate should assume the duties of that political 
office. This process cannot ensure that a majority of citizens w ill vote in favor of 
one candidate or the other, but the extra election increases the probability of 
such a result. Afresh lis t o f candidate names would be generated for the run-off 
election to give voters better alternatives than the candidates in the original 
election. The candidates from the original election would not be eligible to run in 
the special election because voters have already chosen not to elect those 
candidates to public office. The only exception to this rule would be that losing 
candidates from other political races could run for the vacant office in the special 
election. The person with a plurality of the votes in the special election would 
assume the office because “none of these candidates” would not appear on the 
ballot in the special election.
It is unlikely that voters would use the NOTA option frivolously because 
the special election results would be final. There would not be an option for 
NOTA in the special election. Nevada has employed a non-binding version o f 
NOTA for nearly twenty-five years, but NOTA has only taken firs t place in a 
handful o f elections. We should expect more frequent use o f NOTA if we employ 
a binding version of the law, but increased use would not be destructive to 
electoral politics or the state’s economy. Citizens may resolve to exercise their 
option to vote for NOTA in several races immediately after the passage o f such a 
law, but this is a small price to pay for democracy. The threat o f using NOTA 
should be enough to change the way that politicians behave by making them
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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more accountable to their constituents (Pitney, T he Right to Vote No," 1994)/°
If politicians are willing to clean up their act, they w ill not need to worry about 
whether or not NOTA could be used against them or about whether or not NOTA 
will be overused in general.
NOTA opponents argue that parties wilt not be able to find candidates to 
run in the second election, but this is unlikely because second place candidates 
from other political races would be eligible to run in the special election. Often, 
the best candidates on the ballot are running against each other in the same 
political race. For instance, a binding "none of these candidates” law could have 
had a dramatic impact over the 1998 congressional races in Nevada. Senior 
Senator Harry Reid pulled out a narrow victory over the powerful Representative 
John Ensign in the 1998 Nevada senate race. Meanwhile, two relative 
unknowns. Shelly Berkley and Don Chairez, battled for the seat in the House of 
Representatives that Ensign vacated. Assuming that Nevada had a binding 
NOTA system and the race for Ensign's open seat had resulted in a victory for 
"none of the above,” Ensign would have been able to use the special election to 
run fo r re-election to his seat in the House o f Representatives after losing the 
senate race to Reid. In Federalist 10. James Madison established that our 
founding fathers intended to provide an electoral system in which those 
candidates "who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and 
established characters” would be elected to office to represent the people
Pitney, The Right to Vote No,* par. 17.
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(Pitney, “The Right to Vote No,” 1994)/^ A binding “none o f these candidates” 
law would secure a place for losing candidates who possess the merit and desire 
to get elected to other offices by offering voters a chance to restructure candidate 
lists in the special election. This process would ensure that voters retain the 
most valuable candidates and dispose o f the least worthy candidates by 
choosing “none o f the above.” A binding “none of these candidates” law would 
allow voters to send candidates a message waming them to improve when 
candidates are not meeting the standards that the electorate desires. This is a 
far cry from the system that we have now, but binding NOTA offers the possibility 
o f an electoral system that is truly based on merit.
Special Election Details 
Critics have charged that special elections unintentionally favor candidates 
who lose races in the original election because the public is already ̂ m ilia r with 
their candidacies, but this perceived inequality is no different from that 
experienced whenever losing candidates campaign in future elections. The goal 
o f the special election is to find the best potential candidates to sen/e the public.
It would be counterproductive to eliminate suitable candidates simply because 
the public knows them better than the other candidates.
The rules for special general elections would vary slightly from the rules 
fo r special primary elections. In the event that NOTA wins a plurality o f the votes
"  Daniel B. Wood. “Golden State Solution fbr Disgruntled Voters?” In The Christian 
Science Monitor, par. 2 (electronic newsgroup! (10 E>ecemt)er 1997 [cited 10 February 19991): 
available from World Wide Web http://Www.csmonitor.eom/durable/1997/12/10/us/us.5.httTil
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in a general election race, the special election would consist of two elections—a 
special primary election to nominate a new list of candidates from each political 
party and a special general election to determine the winner of the vacant post 
In cases where NOTA wins a plurality o f the votes during a primary election, a 
special primary election would be held within one month of the original primary, 
but the general election would be held on the regularly scheduled date.
In order to maximize voter tumout and minimize the costs of the special 
election, all special elections would be conducted using the vote-by-mail form at 
Opponents have criticized the mail-in election format on grounds that it 
encourages the laziest portion of the electorate to vote and it increases election 
fraud, but widespread use o f the vote-by-mail format in Oregon has proven 
othenwise. Oregon has been using the mail-in election format since 1987 for 
many of the state's local and special elections (Southwell and Burchett, 1997).̂ ^ 
Upon the October 1995 resignation of Oregon Senator Bob Packwood, the state 
conducted a closely monitored special election using the vote-by-mail format to 
find Packwood's successor. The 1996 Oregon Senate election was the firs t 
federal election to require the exclusive use of mail-in ballots.̂ ®
In order to analyze the impact o f the vote-by-mail format on election 
retums, surveys were mailed to the Oregon electorate along with their ballots.
Priscilla L. Southwell and Justin Burchett, “Survey of Vote-By-Mail Senate Election in 
the State of Oregon* in PS: Political Science and Politics, vol. 30, no. 1,53, par. 7 [electronic 
newsgroup} (March 1997 [cited 27 April 1999]); available from Branded Academic ASAP @ 
http://web2.searchbank.comyttw/sesslon/785/98/12668033w5/26{mltview&amlc 1 2
Ibid., par. 1.
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Follow-up surveys were also given by telephone and through the m ail/*
Scholars found that 77% o f the Oregon electorate favored voting through the 
mail, usually because voting-by-mail was more convenient and less time 
consuming/® While one out o f four voters reported that another person was in 
the room while they were filling out their ballot, only three people reported that 
“the presence o f another person made them feel pressured to vote a certain way" 
and only one person reported that his/her vote changed as a result of pressure 
from another person in the room/® Since 99.7% of those surveyed reported no 
perceived pressure to change their vote, Oregon’s vote-by-mail format retained 
the freedom of choice associated with traditional votng.^^
Even though analysis o f the Oregon results revealed a higher incidence of 
non-partisan voting, election results are not likely to be altered by the vote-by- 
mail format̂ ® According to the Oregon study, “partisan advantage is virtually 
non-existent under vote-by-mail" and “the outcome o f the 1996 special Senate 
election appears to have been unaffected by the electoral form at” ®̂ The use of 
the vote-by-mail format in Nevada’s special elections should yield results sim ilar 
to those experienced in Oregon.
Ibid., par. 12.
"  Ibid., Table I.
Ibid., Table II.
"  Ibid., Table II, par. 28. 
Ibid., par. 20.
Ibid., par. 29.
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Significance o f the Study
There is a movement building among at least fifteen states to get binding
preference NOTA on the ballot (Wood, 1997)/° Gary Hoover o f the Free
Congress Foundation suggests that:
Many voters would embrace the idea of NOTA. In 1990,52 percent 
of Texas voters told the Gallup poll that, if  possible, they would 
have voted fo r NOTA instead o f either gubernatorial candidate 
Republican Clayton Williams or Democrat Ann Richards. Louisiana 
voters would have welcomed the option to vote fo r NOTA in their 
1991 race fo r govemor between the bom-again Nazi David Duke 
and the crim inal Edwin Edwards. In a Mason-Dixon poll taken just 
before the vote, 66 percent o f the Louisiana voters wished the state 
had a “None o f the Above” line on its ballot In a hypothetical runoff 
election against Duke and Edwards, NOTA finished with 30 percent 
o f the vote. Ironically, just months before that election, the 
Louisiana legislature rejected a proposal to add NOTA to the state's 
ballots (Hoover, 1993).̂ ^
The Louisiana race that forced voters to chose between “former KKK leader”
David Duke and “ethically-challenged” Edwin Edwards was “dubbed the wizard
versus the lizard” because it typifies the dilemma voters face when they are
forced to chose between two unworthy candidates (Washington State Campaign
for Democracy, 1998).^ Why should voters have to choose between two evils?
Voters see NOTA as a vehicle for positive change in govemment If an
unopposed incumbent casts an unpopular vote in the months just before an
“  Wood. par. 3.
Gaty Hoover, “None o f the Above—The People’s Veto,” in Policy Insights, par.7 [online 
journal] vol.521 (December 1993 [cited 10 February 1999]); available from World Wide Web @ 
httDilWwvy.nota.org/bi521.htm
^  “None of the Above,” par. 6 [Lkd. Washington State Campaign for Democracy— 
Preference None of the Above (NOTA)] [cited 27 April 1999]; available from World Wide Web @ 
httoi/Wwvy.nader96.ora/bnota.htm
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election, why not vote for the “none of the above” line on the ballot? According to 
Common Cause, this scenario is not unlikely since, “79 Congressmen were 
running without major party opposition when the bipartisan' budget bill, which 
contained tax increases, was considered right before the election” (Lilienthal,
1996).^ At that time, voters were faced with the choice of casting their ballot for 
the lesser of two evils or not voting at all. Binding preference NOTA would allow 
voters to express their dissatisfaction with the candidates on the ballot without 
wasting their votes.
Voters may also need NOTA when a scandal is uncovered in the weeks 
just before an election. In 1996, Oregon’s voters found out that republican Wes 
Cooley had allegedly falsified his war record and altered the date on his marriage 
certificate. Sources confirm that, “in the primary, Cooley was unopposed, but 
more blank ballots and write-ins were cast than votes for his renomination” 
(Lilienthal, 1996).̂ ^ Eventually, the Oregon State GOP persuaded Cooley to 
resign, but NOTA would have given voters, instead of party leaders, the 
opportunity to choose whether Cooley's name should appear on the ballot in the 
general election. Daniel Wood o f the Christian Science Monitor compares “none 
of the above” to a police officer driving in traffic because his presence “affects the
^  Steve Lilienthal, "None of the Above’ on Pennsylvania Election Ballots: That Way if 
You Don’t Like the Choices You Still Have a Choice.” in In Depth, par. 4  [Lkd. None of the 
Above—In Depthj (1996 [cited 10 February 1999]); available from World Wide Web @  
htto://Wwvy.nota.ora/niienthal.html
“  Ibid.
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law-abiding behavior o f all drivers within view,” just as the presence of NOTA 
would affect the behavior of every candidate on the ballot (1997).̂ ®
“None o f the above” is gaining momentum on both sides of the ideological 
spectrum. Ralph Nader, Nation magazine and The Boston Globe support NOTA 
on the left side o f the political spectrum while the Wall Street Joumal and the 
Manchester Union-Leader support NOTA on the right (Hoover, 1993).̂ ® Political 
scientists like Curtis Gans, head of the Committee for Study of the American 
Electorate, and Seymour Martin Lipset of Stanford University’s Hoover Institution 
have also voiced their support for binding “none of the above” (Hoover, 1993).̂ ^ 
According to Claremont McKenna Govemment Professor John J. Pitney Jr., 
“NOTA would hardly cure all o f contemporary democracy's problems, but it would 
give voters a better altemative to the bad choices they often find in the polling 
booth and change candidates' behavior for the better” (Pitney, 1994).̂ ®
“  Wood. par. 9.
“  Hoover, par. 12.
^  Ibid., par. 13.
“  John J. Pitney. Jr., The Right to Vole fiar None of the Above: 'NOTA' Bcpands Ballot 
Options.” par. 1 [Lkd. The Center for Voting and Democracy—The Right to Vote for None of the 
Above] (May 1994 [cited 2 July 1999]); availabie from Worid Wide Web @ 
htto:/Awww.fiairvote.oro/cvd reoorts/1995/cho6/bitnev.html
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF TURNOUT STATISTICS 
Throughout this chapter we will be evaluating the connection between 
dissatisfaction with Nevada’s electoral system and low voter turnout Nevada is 
only one case study, but it provides the best indicators for evaluating people's 
reactions to a binding “none o f these candidates” law because it is the only state 
that currently employs a non-binding form of NOTA. This chapter w ill focus on 
aspects of a binding “none of these candidates” law that offer encouragement for 
citizens who are reluctant to vote in Nevada’s elections. Not only w ill a binding 
“none o f these candidates” law make our society more democratic, but it will also 
open the lines of communication between citizens and legislators so that other 
problems may be resolved in the process.
Even though Nevada’s version of NOTA does not take advantage o f the 
fu ll impact that “none o f these candidates” can have on democracy, it is receiving 
increasing attention as a symbol for democratic voting in the United States. More 
than twenty-five states employ some variation of NOTA in at least one political 
race, but Nevada is the only state to mandate the appearance o f “none o f these 
candidates” below the lis t o f candidate names in every statewide political race. 
NOTA is the equivalent of a “no confidence” vote in a parliamentary system, but it 
is exercised by the people rather than by the legislature (Nader, “None of the
16
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Above, 1999)/ The opportunity for voters to withhold their consent from a 
particular list o f candidates makes NOTA democratic.
Democracy
Political theorists have traditionally defined democracy as the people 
ruling themselves. In order to rule themselves effectively in a representative 
democracy, citizens must consent to being governed and they must be given a 
meaningful choice as to who will represent them. The existing electoral system 
fails on both counts. In our system, citizens consent to allowing representatives 
to make decisions for them by voting in elections, but there is no conventional 
mechanism in place for withholding consent from a set o f candidates for public 
office. When candidates run for office without opposition, citizens are forced 
without consent to having these officials make decisions for them, even if a 
majority of voters would have voted against the candidate. In this case, they are 
not free to rule themselves because they are not making the ultimate decision 
regarding who w ill represent them and how they w ill be ruled. In cases where 
citizens are forced to choose between two unacceptable candidates, voters are 
robbed of the opportunity to withhold their consent from that slate o f candidates. 
Voters in this situation must consent to the lesser o f two evils because they are 
given no recourse other than leaving the ballot blank. While our system provides 
us with a conventional method for consenting, it offers no conventional method
' Ralph Nader, “None of the Above: Proper, Long Overdue,’  In Policy Insights, par. 3 
[online Journal] [cited 27 April 1999]; available from World Wide Web @ 
htto://www:nader96.oiq/nota1.htm
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for withholding consent from a particular lis t o f candidates. A  protest vote in the
form o f a binding “none of these candidates” law would offer citizens the option of
withholding their consent without compelling citizens to challenge the
govemment through unconventional protests. In order to express consent, the
people must have the option of withholding their consent as well. An act is not
consensual if you are forced into it. According to political scientist John J. Pitney,
NOTA would secure the right to say no. If free govemment is really 
based on the consent of the govemed, it follows that people should 
have a clear way of withholding consent from the unworthy, the 
unknown, or the unopposed (The Right to Vote for None of the 
Above, 1994).̂
Non-voting is not an effective option for withholding consent because non-voting
has traditionally been considered a silent expression of consent
Potential voters may feel that there is no use voting because there is not a
meaningful difference between the candidates of the two ruling parties. The
more potential voters protest by staying home on Election Day, the more elected
officials feel that they can dismiss the wishes of their constituents and
concentrate on pleasing interest groups and elites. According to Steve Lilienthal:
American voters are supposed to have choices between—at the 
very least—two candidates offering contrasting philosophies. 
However, all too often, their choices are severely circumscribed 
because today’s political campaigns have become contests, not of 
ideas, but o f poll ratings and fundraising prowess (1998).®
* John J. Pitney, Jr., T h e Rightto Vote for None of the Above; 'NOTA’ Expands Ballot 
Options,” par.1 [Lkd. The Center for Voting and Democracy—The Right to vote for None of the 
Above] (May 1994 [cited 2 July 1999]); available from World Wide Web @  
http://Www.Mrvote.ora/bvd reoorts/l995/ichD6/bltnev.htmt
 ̂Steve Lilienthal. "NOTA’ Movement Working to Place 'None of the Above’ Option on 
Ballots,” par. 1 [Lkd. LPC Monthly February 1998—*NOTA* Movement] (February 1998 [cited 2 
July 1999]); available from World Wide Web @ http://Www.ca.lp.ora/lDcm/9802-NOTAhtmt
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NOTA allows third party voters to clump their votes together in a manner that 
ensures that their votes w ill be counted and reported in the Secretary of State’s 
official election results. This gives voters the opportunity to bring public attention 
to their lack o f confidence in the candidates listed on the ballot Binding “none of 
these candidates” option would allow voters to show their disapproval for the 
candidates listed on the baliot without abstaining from participation in the 
electoral process or wasting their vote on an option that cannot win the election.
Turnout Statistics 
The widening gap between citizens eligible to vote and actual voters 
indicates that citizens are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their electoral 
choices. According to Winders, “less than 70% of the voting-age population in 
the U.S. is registered to vote” and tumout among our nation’s youth ranks twenty 
percent below the national average (1999).̂  If this dissatisfaction cannot be 
cured, “none of these candidates” may be able to mitigate some o f the problems 
by offering citizens an institutional outlet for their dissatisfaction. Citizens should 
not be forced to resort to unconventional protest when an effective ballot 
measure is all that is needed for them to express their dissatisfaction. A binding 
“none o f these candidates” option allows citizens to constructively express their 
criticism against candidates on tire  ballot without abstaining from the electoral 
process altogether.
* Bill Winders, T he Roller Coaster of Class Conflict: Class Segments, Mass Mobilization 
and Voter Tumout in the U.S., 1840-1996.” Social Forces. March 1999, vol. 77, no. 3,839.
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Figure 1. Registration and Tumout 
Percentages in Nevada
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Figure illustrates the pattern for registration and voting in Nevada. The 
data fo r Figure 1 was obtained by dividing the number o f people who are old
 ̂ Federal Election Commission. Voter Reoatration and Tumout—1996. Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1996. ONLINE. [22 July 1999]; available from World Wide Web @ 
httD://vvww.fec.QOv/Daaes/96to.htm
Heller, Dean, Ed. The Political Htetorv of Nevada 1996. Carson City; Nevada, 1997, 
302-329.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 732, 
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: September 1978," U.S. Govemment 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 879, 
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: March 1980," U.S. Govemment 
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 1980.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 916, 
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: July 1982," U S. Govemment Printing 
Offk», Washington, D.C., 1982.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Poouiatidn Reports. Series P-25, No. 947, 
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: November 1984," U.S. Govemment 
Printing Office, Washington, D C., 1984.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Pooutatibn Reports. Series P-25, No. 1019, 
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: January 1988," U.S. Govemment 
Printing Office. Washington, D C., 1988.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Poouiatidn Reports. Series P-25, No. 1059, 
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age fbr the States: April 1990," U.S. Govemment Printing 
Office, Washington. D C .. 1990.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 1085, 
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age fbr the States: April 1992." U.S. Govemment Printing 
Office. Washington, D C .. 1992.
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enough to vote in Nevada by the number o f registered voters and by the number 
of people who voted for each presidential election year surveyed.̂  The 
percentage of registered voters reached its lowest point in the survey during the 
1980 presidential election when only 49.6% of Nevada’s voting age population 
was registered to vote. Between 1980 and 1992 the percentage o f registered 
voters and the percentage of people who voted gradually increased by 15% and 
9% respectively, but since the 1992 election, tumout has decreased and 
registration rates have remained the same. The lowest level of voter tumout 
during the years surveyed occurred in 1996 when only 38.3% of Nevada's 
eligible voters showed up at the polls.
By June 1999,150,618 voters were registered as non-partisans or third 
party supporters. The rest o f Nevada’s 893,061 registered voters were almost 
evenly split between the Republican Party (371,499) and the Democratic Party 
(370,944).^ Only 64% of Nevada’s voting age population is currently registered 
to vote and only 38% of the voting age population tumed out to vote in the 1996 
Presidential Election. According to the Federal Election Commission, Nevada’s 
registration rates rank 10% below the national average and tumout ranks 11%
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Serfes P-25. No. 1132, 
‘‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States; April 1998," U.S. Govemment Printing 
Office, Washington, DC .. 1998.
 ̂The number of people counted to ascertain the voting age population is slightly Inflated 
because a small percentage of adults are not eligible to vote due to their status as a citizen of 
another country, convicted felon or mentally incompetent person as determined by a court of law.
 ̂Nevada’s County Clerks and Registrars of Voters. "Statewide Voter Registration 
Figures fbr the End of June 1999 by County and Party." ONLINE. (June 1999 [cited 22 July 
1999]); Secretary of State available @ http://sos.nv.us/rivetection/voter rea/0699main.htm
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below the national average.® This information is even more alarming when we 
note that Nevada’s population is growing faster than any other westem state, but 
tumout rates have not increased as quickly in comparison.® In the ten-year 
interval between 1980 and 1990, Nevada’s voting age population increased by 
50% while the percentage of voters among the voting age population Increased 
by only 27%. During the eight years between 1990 and 1998 Nevada’s 
population increased again by 45% while the percentage of voters among the 
voting age population increased by a mere 37%.̂ ® According to the data 
presented in Figure 1, roughly ten percent of the registered public failed to 
exercise their right to vote In each Presidential election year surveyed. While the 
percentage o f citizens registered to vote in Nevada remained constant between 
the 1992 and 1996 election cycles, more than one-fourth of the registered public 
abstained from voting in 1996. This suggests that despite Nevada’s tremendous 
population growth between the 1992 and 1996 election cycles, the number of 
people who register to vote in Nevada is relatively stable and the number of
® Federal Election Commission. Voter Registration and Turnout—1996. Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1996. ONLINE. [22 July 1999]; available from World Wide Web @ 
httD://Www.fec.QOv/baQes/96to.htm
 ̂Narroll, Maud and Sandra Allen. Budget and Planning Department “Nevada Statistical 
Abstract" A special report prepared in cooperation with the Nevada Department of 
Administration. ONLINE. [22 July 1999]; Governor available at 
htto://www.state.nv.us/budQet/saDOD.htm
Nevada Secretary of State. "1998 Official Election Results." ONLINE. (December 
1998 [cited 22 July 1999]); Secretary of State available: httDVfeos.state.nv.us/nvelection/
U.S. Department of Commerce. Number of Inhabitants. Bureau of the Census. U.S. 
Govemment Printing Office. Washington D C ., 1980.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Number of inhabitants. Bureau of the Census. U.S. 
Govemment Printing Office. Washington D C ., 1990.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Number of inhabitants. Bureau of the Census. 
Washington D.C., (1998 [cited 5 March 1999]}; available from Worid Wide Web @ 
httD:/Awww.census.aov/DODulation/estimatesfetate/st-98-1.txt
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people who actually vote is declining. Many believe that dissatisfaction with 
govemment is the reason behind this decline. According to Rock the Vote 
President Mark Strama, “public frustration with govemment has been the most 
powerful force in American politics in the 1990’s” (75).̂ '' Low voter tumout is one 
consequence of that frustration.
While the current “none o f these candidates” law has provided an 
ineffective solution for the growing tumout problem, a binding “none of these 
candidates” law offers some hope of inspiring registered voters to show up at the 
polls on Election Day. The temporary increase in voter tum out seen in 1992 may 
suggest that a growing number o f Nevadans who would not go to the polls in 
order to vote for a lesser of two evils, w ill go if  given another choice. Many non­
partisans and third party voters went to the polls on Election Day in 1992 so that 
they could vote fo r Ross Perot because the Perot candidacy appealed to people 
who are alienated by the politics o f the two major parties. According to Rock the 
Vote President Mark Strama:
The movement away from party allegiance is especially 
pronounced among young people. . .  Rock the Vote registers more 
Independents than Republicans and Democrats combined. . .  
Young people te ll us all the time that no one in the political system 
seems to be talking to them. (1998)^^
The Perot candidacy provided a viable altemative to the politics o f the two major
parties in 1992, but that meaningful altemative deteriorated with Perots last
Mark Strama. "Overcoming Cynkasm: Youth Participation and Becforat Politics." 
Nationat Civic Review. Spring 1998, vol. 87. no. 1,75.
"Ibid., 77-78.
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minute candidacy in 1996. As Figure 2̂ ® suggests, third party votes among 
Nevada's statewide political contests increased from 9,878 in 1988 to a record- 
breaking 168,975 in 1992.̂ "̂  At the same time, “none of these candidates” votes 
remained relatively stable. This suggests that the increase in 1992 tumout 
shown in Figure 1 and the increase in 1992 third party votes can be explained by 
the attraction o f disenchanted voters to the perceived viability o f Perot’s third 
party candidacy. By waiting until the last minute to announce his candidacy in 
1996, Ross Perot ̂ ile d  to inspire all o f his 1992 supporters to vote on Election 
Day. If Perofs supporters knew that he was running for the presidency in 1996, 
they may have fe lt that he did not have a reasonable chance of winning because 
Perot support decreased from 26% of Nevada voters in 1992 to 9% of Nevada 
voters in the 1996 presidential election. Tumout decreased by 12% and third 
party votes decreased by 113,522 votes the same year because non-partisans 
and third party supporters who voted for Perot in 1992 decided to stay home on 
Election Day in 1996. This data tells us that there is support for altemative 
candidates among potential voters, but those voters w ill not show up on Election 
Day unless they perceive a reasonable chance o f changing the election results.
A binding “none o f these candidates” law offers hope for these disenchanted 
voters by allowing them to voice their disapproval against candidates who do not 
adequately address their needs, offering them a consistent altemative to the two
13 Heller, 313-329.
The data for Figure 2 was calculated by adding all third party votes fbr statewide offices 
recorded In Nevada for each year surveyed. These totals do not reflect solety the number of 
people who voted for Perot In the 1992 election.
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major parties and giving them a reason to show up at their polling place on 
Election Day.
More than 70% of the nation’s eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds abstained 
from voting in the 1996 election.̂ ® The irony in that statistic is that more people 
in this age group are participating in community activities through volunteer work 
than ever before. In 1997 UCLA conducted a nationwide survey of college 
freshmen. The survey found that college freshmen were more likely to spend 
time doing volunteer work in 1997 than they were in 1967, but they also found 
that college freshmen in 1997 were less concerned about politics than any other 
class over the last thirty years.̂ ® The study indicated that these young people 
could not see any connection between their volunteer work and politics.̂ ^ The 
young people in the study did not want to be associated with politics and they 
lacked any view o f how they had contributed to society beyond the immediate 
gratification for themselves and those they were helping. The study concluded 
that their actions are a result o f an unprecedented decline in trust for govemment 
that is correlated with the decline in electoral participation. Allowing voters to 
publicly voice their distrust through “none o f the above” may be a step towards 
bringing potential voters back in to electoral politics by creating a dialogue 
between citizens and politicians about how to solve problems with the political 
system.
15 Strama, 71.
"Ib id .
"Ib id .
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A survey conducted by Rock the Vote found that only 27% of adults 
between the ages o f seventeen and twenty-nine believed that the 1996 
presidential candidates were honest or truthful (1998)/® According to Strama. 
young people are “skeptical o f political parties, frustrated with the political 
process, and distrustful o f politicians” (1998)/® We can only hope that a binding 
“none o f these candidates” law can motivate those who are distrustful of 
candidates on the ballot to come to the polls and voice their distrust publicly. A 
significant “none o f the above” vote may motivate the two major parties to realign 
themselves so that the needs of disengaged voters are addressed in the political 
system. If voter outrage, due to the lack of an honest candidate, is a factor in the 
declining tumout rate, “none of the above” offers some hope of fixing the problem 
by threatening the candidacy o f any politician who voters deem unworthy of 
political office.
Declining partisanship appears to be a strong motivating factor in declining 
participation. As the public has become less partisan in nature, politicians have 
moved toward the center o f the ideological spectrum in order to attract voters. 
This middle of the road phenomenon is correlated with the downward spiral in 
citizen participation rates. Since both parties are walking the center line on 
political issues, partisan disagreements have focused on programmatic 
differences rather than general ideological différences. These “programmatic 
differences” usually revolve around how much funding should be given to specific
"  Ibid.
"  Ib id .
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policies and how specific portions o f a b ill should be tailored rather than focusing 
on ideological disagreements. Such dry issues do not attract the attention of the 
mass public because they focus on technical specialization rather than on a core 
ideological assumption that can be applied to various policies. While this trend 
makes our politics more homogeneous, it also makes the choice between two 
candidates (holding subtle variations o f the same viewpoint) less significant If 
there is no real difference between candidates, why bother voting? A binding 
“none o f these candidates” law would give citizens who stray from the center of 
the ideological spectrum an opportunity to voice their disapproval of various 
policies without discouraging citizens from voting. Not only do candidates have 
to listen to the arguments o f the opposing party in a binding “none o f the above” 
system, but they also have to listen to the arguments o f a disenchanted non­
partisan coalition with the option to choose “none o f the above.”
Figure 2̂ ® is a summary of the average vote fo r “none o f these 
candidates” among all statewide general election races and the highest vote for 
“none o f these candidates” in any one general election race between 1976 and 
1996. While the average “none o f these candidates” vote averaged across all of 
the election years studied is only 8%, the figure illustrates that “none o f these 
candidates” w ill usually earn approximately 20% of the vote in at least one 
statewide race. Thus, one in five voters w ill be dissatisfied with every candidate 
listed on the ballot in at least one statewide general election race. The average 
and highest NOTA votes fo r the presidential election years surveyed (8.5% and
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17.7%, respectively) are roughly equal to the average and highest NOTA votes 
experienced in the off-year elections sun/eyed (8.2% and 18.2%, respectively). 
Thus, we may conclude that state supreme court races stabilize the number of 
NOTA votes so that the difference between presidential election years and off- 
year elections is no longer noticeable.
Figure 2. General Election NOTA
Votes in Nevada
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19781976 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 19941990 1992 1996 AVG
8% 7% 5% 6% 8% 7% 4% 7%14% 12% 14% 8%Average NOTA
22% 23% 12% 18% 18% 17% 7% 21%27% 26% 24% 20%Highest NOTA
Bection Years Surveyed
Even though Nevada's current "none o f these candiates” law cannot 
change election outcomes, voters often choose to invoke the "none of these 
candidates” option in statewide primary races. Figure 3^̂  shows the average 
vote fo r "none o f these candidates” in every statewide primary race from 1976 
through 1996, the average "none o f these candidates” vote in each statewide
^  Ibid.. 313-329. The AVG column represents the average of the totals from all of the 
years surveyed in each category.
Ibid.. 345-353.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
party primary, and the highest “none o f these candidates" vote in each election 
year sunreyed. The year 1984 was omitted from the table because there were 
no statewide primary races In that year. The 1996 average “none o f these 
candidates” vote for the democratic party primary was also omitted because the 
democrats did not hold any statewide primaries that year. The 9% figure for the 
other three categories in 1996 result from only one statewide republican primary 
held in that year. The average “none o f these candidates" vote among 
Democrats (12%) and Republicans (16%) in their party primaries are relatively 
similar. NOTA does not appear to benefit one party over the other. This explains 
why “none of these candidates" is considered a non-partisan reform with 
advocates on both sides of the political spectrum. The intense frequency of 
“none o f these candidates” votes tabulated in primary elections suggests that 
voters are attempting to send their political parties a message to recruit stronger 
candidates or risk party members defecting and voting for another party's 
candidate. This message is currently ineffective because parties know that 
“none of the above” votes w ill not cost them the election. A binding NOTA 
system would force political parties to recruit stronger candidates to run in the 
primary election or risk having to recruit a second batch o f candidates for the 
special election.
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Figure 3. Primary Election NOTA Votes
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Figure 4. General Election Tumout Drop-off
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Figure 5. Primary Election Tumout Drop-off
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The level of tum out drop-off depicted in Figure 4 ^  and Figure 5^  indicates 
heightening dissatisfaction among citizens who regularly vote. Drop-off is 
characterized by a tendency to vote for some offices on the ballot, but reject 
voting fo r others. These citizens go to the polls and vote fo r the candidates at 
the top o f the ticket, but they refuse to vote for state Supreme Court justices and 
local officials at the bottom of the ticket Levels of tumout drop-off are significant 
to the study of the “none o f these candidates" law because NOTA opponents 
believe that tumout drop-off currently demonstrates lack o f confidence in the 
candidates on the ballot without humiliating any elected officials running for 
office. Upon original consideration of Nevada's “none o f these candidates” law, 
the Clark County Registrar o f Voters, Stanton Colton, told the assembly “the total 
number o f votes cast fo r all candidates, subtracted from the total number o f 
people who voted in that precinct, provides you with an expression of no- 
confidence.” According to Colton, this eliminates the need for a “none o f these 
candidates” law to make the information public (Colton, 1975).̂ '*
When the Nevada assembly originally debated the merits of Mello's “none 
o f these candidates” law, opponents focused on tumout drop-off as one reason 
for rejecting the landmark legislation. These speakers claimed that drop-off is
^  Ibid., 345-353. For the purposes ofthis study, partisan races include Presidents Vice- 
President, Senator, U.S. Representatwe, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State. 
Treasurer, Controller and Attorney General.
^  Ibid., 313-329. In order to account for blank cells, the reader should note that there 
was no Democratic Primary in 1988 or 1992 and there was no Republican Primary in 1996. 
Neither par^ held a statewide primary in 1984.
Stanton B. Cotton to Assemblyman Daniel Demers, 7 March 1975, Election Committee 
Minutes—March 18.1975. (Carson City, 1975), 1-2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
indicative o f the number o f voters who lack confidence in the candidates on the 
ballot, therefore making a line on the ballot reading “none o f the above” 
redundant and unnecessary. The problem is that tumout drop-off is still focusing 
on non-voting as a method for voters to withhold consent from a list of 
candidates. If drop-off is synonymous with lack of confidence for the candidates 
listed on the ballot, calculations o f tumout drop-off should be looked at in 
conjunction with the number of registered voters who stayed home on Election 
Day. While NOTA opponents may view tumout drop o ff as an expression of a 
lack of confidence, other officials attribute tumout drop-off to less menacing 
factors like ballot M gue or lack o f party cues.^ One way to determine how 
much tumout drop-off is indicative of a lack o f confidence for candidates on the 
ballot is to enact binding “none o f the above” legislation.
Figure 4 demonstrates that while 97% of those who vote usually vote in 
every partisan race, 13% o f those who vote w ill usually refuse to cast their ballot 
for at least one supreme court justice or local official in the general election. This 
is significant because the costs to the voter for checking a few extra boxes are 
minimal. Most supreme court races are either uncontested or non-competitive 
due to the lack o f knowledge o f the candidates listed on the ballot^^ While 
tumout drop-off may sometimes indicate a lack o f confidence with candidates on 
the ballot, elected officials w ill not take it seriously when it does not have the
“  Nevada Assembly, Election Committee, Election Committee Minutes—March 18.1975. 
(Carson City, 1975), 1-2.
Nevada Assembly, Election Committee. Election Committee Minutes—March 25.1975. 
(Carson City, 1975), 2.
26 Heller, 313-329.
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power to affect their re-election prospects. A binding 'none of these candidates” 
law would allow voters to send candidates a clear signal conveying their lack of 
trust for candidates on the ballot.
Tumout drop-off rates increase significantly in primary elections where 
nearly one-third of those voting abstain from casting ballots in at least one 
primary race. Without significant tumout drop-off from party members, there 
would be more votes fo r supreme court justices and local officials than for 
partisan offices. In the state primary, non-partisans receive a ballot that does not 
include any partisan races, but partisans vote for both partisan and non-partisan 
offices. In a hypothetical primary we can assume that 400,000 Republican 
ballots are sent out, 400,000 Democratic primary ballots are sent out and 
200,000 non-partisan primary ballots are sent out. We w ill also assume that half 
o f the people in each category vote in the primary election and people who vote 
cast ballots do so for every office on the ticket. The results would be 500,000 
votes for non-partisan offices and 200,000 votes for each party’s candidates in 
the primary election. Even if we combine the votes for partisan offices, non- 
partisan votes exceed partisan votes by 100,000 votes. If there were 0 ballots 
returned from non-partisans and all o f the partisans voted for every office on the 
ballot, there would still be 400,000 votes in non-partisan races and 400,000 votes 
in partisan races. Thus, without high tumout drop-off and low non-partisan 
tumout in primary elections, non-partisan votes would always outnumber partisan 
votes in the primary election. Since partisans vote fb r members o f their own 
party as well as non-partisan offices In the state primary, one would expect that
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the combination of partisan and non-partisan votes would be significantly higher 
than votes fo r partisan offices from either of the two major parties. Ironically, 
despite the increasing number of non-partisan voters casting ballots in Nevada's 
primary elections, partisan offices get more votes than non-partisan offices due 
to tumout drop-off and low tumout among non-partisans In primary elections. 
Allowing voters to choose the “none of these candidates” option in local races 
would lead to less tumout drop-off by weeding out candidates that voters have 
deemed unworthy of political office. Significant victories for NOTA in primary 
elections would send party leaders a message to recruit a stronger slate o f 
candidates in the next election.
A review of Nevada’s low voter tumout, the high percentages o f non­
binding NOTA votes in Nevada’s electoral system and the dramatic drop-off rate 
among voters suggest that voters are dissatisfied with elected officials in Nevada. 
The average NOTA vote from 1976 to 1996 is 8%. Extremely low NOTA votes in 
presidential races depress the NOTA average over all elections because the 
presidential race normally attracts extraordinarily qualified candidates for public 
office. Races for supreme court justice reflect the opposite extreme. The 
average NOTA vote among races for a seat as a justice on the Nevada Supreme 
Court is 17%. The lowest NOTA vote that was received in any supreme court 
justice race was 5%. Seventeen percent o f voters w ill cast their ballot for 
president and vice president without voting for Nevada supreme court justices in 
the average presidential election year, while 12% o f citizens w ill cast their ballot 
for governor or senator in the average off-year election without voting for any
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supreme court justices. Nevada supreme court justices, like other less known 
politicians, often run unopposed. The binding version o f “none of these 
candidates” would offer voters an automatic altemative to these unopposed 
candidates. According to Dr. Pitney, “with NOTA, even unopposed candidates 
could lose if the voters deemed them unworthy” (1994).^ “The prospect of such 
a defeat might discourage bottom-feeders from seeking office, and would give 
party leaders an incentive to consider merit when making endorsements,” quips 
Pitney (1994).“
Often, citizens are given no choice regarding their elected officials 
because there is only one candidate running for office. Figure 6“  illustrates the 
frequency o f races where only one candidate is running fo r political office in 
Nevada. In cases where elections are uncontested, we simply award the 
election to a person who filled out the application to have their name placed on 
the ba llo t Citizens are still asked to come to the polls and vote in uncontested 
general election races, but we do not give these citizens any option for voting 
against uncontested officials. The “none o f these candidates” option offers 
voters a way to withdraw their consent from a candidate when he or she is the 
only person on the ba llo t Nevada law does not permit the appearance of 
uncontested races on primary ballots; hence, there is no institutional outlet for 
withholding consent from candidates in uncontested primaries. Unlike other
^Ib id . 
“  Ibid.
“  Heller. 313-329; 330-353.
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States, Nevada (aw also prohibits writing in a candidate that voters prefer over 
those candidates listed on the ballot The “none of these candidates” option 
provides disapproving citizens with their only opportunity to have their complaints 
against unopposed candidates documented in the official election results. The 
“none o f the above” option makes voting more democratic because it offers 
citizens an altemative to voting for unopposed candidates.
Figure 6. Uncontested Races
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Uncontested races present a very real problem In Nevada’s electoral 
system. The lack o f an opponent deprives voters of their right to choose who will 
represent them because they are forced to consent to the only candidate on the 
ballot or abstain from voting altogether. If voters are not given an effective 
choice as to which candidates they can elect, the process is not democratic. 
Figure 8 indicates that between 1976 and 1996,37% of all general election races 
were uncontested in Nevada. Eleven percent o f Nevada's statewide offices were 
uncontested in the same time frame. The statistics for primary races are even 
more alarming. On average, 67% of all primary races and 44% of statewide 
primaries offer voters only one candidate to choose from. Figure 7 shows that 
about half o f all offices were uncontested in five of the eleven general election 
years surveyed— 1976,1978,1984,1990 and 1996^°. When opposing 
candidates are absent from half o f the offices on the ballot, we begin to question 
how so-called “elected officials” are chosen for office. In uncontested races, 
candidates who file  paperwork to run for office are automatically selected to fill 
the position. This procedure could have a devastating effect on the quality of 
elected officials. Local races are 26% more likely than statewide races to be 
uncontested on average, but statewide elected offices are the only offices that 
give voters the “none o f these candidates” option in Nevada—even when races 
fo r local offices have no opposing candidates. Democracy thrives on the citizens’
^  Ibid., 313-329,345-354. For the purposes of this study. Presidents Vice President,
U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State 
Treasurer. State Controller, Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice Seats A through E are 
considered statewide or national offices. The title national office was added because the office of 
US Representative in Congress was not considered a statewide office after the state gained a 
second seat in the House of Representatives in 1982.
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for local offices have no opposing candidates. Democracy thrives on the citizens’ 
ability to make a choice about the way they want to be governed and who w ill 
represent his interests best Nevada’s current system does not offer 
disenchanted voters a meaningful choice when there is only one candidate listed 
on the ballot, you can vote for that candidate or not vote at all. The binding 
version of “none of these candidates” would offer voters an automatic alternative 
to unopposed candidates.
Dissatisfied citizens are not given any real choice when it comes to 
representation. The lack of a clear alternative to the candidates listed on the 
ballot illustrates a weakness in our electoral system. When a citizen does not 
approve of any o f the candidates listed on the ballot, his choices are limited to 
choosing the lesser o f two evils or not voting at all. Since non-voting does not 
prevent unworthy candidates from taking office, it is not a viable method of 
consenting to or withdrawing your consent from a particular slate of government 
officials. Citizens are not given a democratic choice when they are deprived of 
the ability to withhold their consent from a lis t o f candidates fo r public office. 
Consent should be a positive demonstration of approval for a candidate instead 
o f a choice between lesser evils. Amending ballots so that “none of these 
candidates” appears beneath the list o f candidate names fo r every office would 
give voters the option o f formally withholding their consent from all o f the 
candidates on the ba llot This gives disenchanted voters a reason to come to the 
polls on Election Day and it puts elected officials more in touch with the needs 
and desires o f their constituents. At the same time, “none o f these candidates”
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would offer the electorate a chance to demonstrate their approval for a new slate 
of candidates instead of limiting voters to a choice between two evils.
The option to choose NOTA would increase citizens' feelings of political 
efficacy. Frequent occurences of uncontested races can decrease citizens’ 
feelings of political efficacy by consistently robbing them of their opportunity to 
elect public officials. In a binding NOTA system, special elections would exist as 
proof that citizens’ voices have been heard and candidates would be accountable 
to their constituents. Voters would no longer have to decide on the lesser o f two 
evils. If voters do not like the candidates, they can cast their ballots for NOTA. 
“None of these candidates” provides an institutional outlet for expressing 
dissatisfaction with politicians. Citizens would no longer have to demonstrate 
their dissatisfaction by abstaining on Election Day. A mobilized electorate is vital 
to the concept o f democracy. The people must express their wishes in order to 
rule themselves democratically. If NOTA can reform our current system of 
choosing between lesser evils to provide a choice between responsive policy­
makers, the benefits would be priceless.
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CHAPTER 3
THE INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE 
Once a candidate is elected to office, the system Is tailored to discourage 
citizens from withdrawing their consent from that elected official. Incumbent 
congressmen are given a variety of resources for communicating with their 
constituents including free postage for official business, free use of studios to 
produce radio and television footage, internet service, and free long distance 
telephone service (Jacobson, 1997).̂  Congressmen also have a generous 
budget to pay for their office space, personal staff and travel to and from the 
district (Jacobson, 1997).̂  Challengers must pay for such luxuries either from 
their own pockets or through fundraising efforts.
The retention rate o f incumbent congressmen demonstrates that a second 
candidate on the ballot does not always induce enough competition to give voters 
a real choice. Common Cause, a watchdog group created to keep citizens 
informed about elected officials, calculates that on average 90% of House 
congressional elections are not competitive, “meaning that either there is no 
major party opponent to the incumbent or that the opponent is grossly under-
' Gary C. Jacobson. The Politics of Congressional Elections (New York: Addison Wesley 
Educational Publishers, 1997). 29.
^Ibid.
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financed" (Nader, None o f the Above: Proper, Long, Overdue, 1999).̂  One study 
of the 1988 campaign season concluded that an incumbent congressman’s odds 
of dying during his term in office were actually higher that his odds of losing a 
reelection attempt due to the 98% incumbent retention rate In that election 
(Hoover, 1993).̂  There was a 93% incumbent retention rate in the U.S.
Congress in 1992 despite public outrage over the House bank scandal, 
controversy surrounding congressmen voting for financial incentives to retire 
early and redistricting following the 1990 census (Hoover, 1993).® Former 
California Secretary o f State Tony M iller contends that, “the inability to raise huge 
sums o f money to match incumbent war chest funds sometimes drives potentially 
excellent candidates from the arena altogether” (1994).® “Eighteen house races 
in eleven states topped one million dollars” in 1990, according to one study 
(Miller, 1994).̂  Few challengers can muster the finances and support to throw an 
incumbent out o f office. Voters may be given a choice between an unworthy 
incumbent and an unknown challenger who lacks the financial resources to win
® Ralph Nader, “None of the Above: Proper, Long Overdue,” in Policy Insights, par. 8. 
[online journal] [cited 27 April 1999]; available from World Wide Web @ 
httD://www.nader96.ora/nota1 .htm
* Gary Hoover. “None o f the Above—The People's Veto,” in Policy Insights, par. 5 [online 
Journal] vol. 521 (December 1993 [cited 10 February 1999D; available from World Wide Web @ 
http://Www.nota.ora/bi521 .htm
®lbid.
® Tony Miller. "The Case for None of the Above,” in Policy Insights, par. 3 [online Joumai] 
vol. 615 (September 1994 [citect 10 March 1999]); available from World Wide Web @  
httDr//Www.nota.ora/bi61 Shtml
 ̂Ibid.. par. 4.
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the election (Pitney, The Right to Vote No, 1994).® Since media moguls and 
campaign patrons often ignore minor party candidates, they have “little hope o f 
competing in any real way to provide voters with a clear alternative to their better 
known, vastly better-funded opponents" (Miller, 1994).® Faced with 
Insurmountable odds, qualified challengers are often driven away from public 
office. “None of the above" ensures that there is always a recognizable 
candidate to challenge entrenched incumbents; that candidate is “none of the 
above.”
Figure 7. General Election Races
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® John J. Pitney, Jr.. The Right to Vote No: NOTA Ballot Options,” In Policv Insights, par. 
2 [online Journal] vol. 606 (May 1994 [cited 10 February 1999]); available from World Wide Web 
<a htto://Www.nota.ora/bi608.htmt
'  Miller, par. 3.
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While these statistics reflect incumbency trends across the United States, 
an inquiry into Nevada elections provides sim ilar results. In the average election 
year, nearly half o f the offices on the Nevada ballot feature an incumbent running 
for re-election.̂ ° To make matters worse, the incumbent faces only a 15% 
chance that he w ill lose his re-election bid. “None of these candidates” 
challenges incumbents to prove that they are worthy of re-election when they are 
not facing competition from other candidates on the ballot Competition among 
political candidates allows voters to choose the most worthy candidate instead of 
settling on an incumbent who does not adequately represent their interests.
Figure 7̂  ̂represents the likelihood that an incumbent w ill be running for 
any given seat during the election years surveyed. Calculations for Figure 7 are 
obtained by dividing the total number o f races by the number of incumbents 
running for re-election thatyear.^^ The figure suggests that more incumbents run 
for office during presidential election years, regardless o f whether you are looking 
at local, state or national races in Nevada. According to Figure 7, an average of 
49% o f the races on the ballot between 1976 and 1996 feature incumbents. The 
average increases to 56% If you look exclusively at the presidential election 
years surveyed and drops to 41% if you look only at off-year elections. The 
percentage o f races involving incumbents increased steadily during presidential
The calculation that Incumbents are running for 49% of the offices on the ballot in the 
average election year between 1976 and 1996 is based on data revealed in Figure 7.
"  Heller, Dean, Ed. The Political Histonr of Nevada 1996. Carson City: Nevada, 1997, 
313-329.
For the purposes of Figure 7 and Rgure 8, local offices refer only to those offices listed 
in Secretary of State Dean Heller's Political History of Nevada 1996. These offices include two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
election years through 1984 and then decreased from 72% in 1980 to 44% in 
1984. Since the incumbency rate during a presidential election year reached its 
low of 44% in 1984, it has increased gradually in each subsequent election, 
falling at 67% in 1996. The trend toward incumbents campaigning in off-year 
elections increased gradually from its low of 18% in 1982 to its high of 67% in 
1990, but the number decreased to 43% in the 1994 election cycle. The 
percentage of offices that feature incumbents between 1976 and 1996 range 
from a low of 18% in 1982 to a high of 72% in 1984.
At the state and national level. Figure 7 reveals that an average o f 66% of 
the races on Nevada's ballots involved incumbents running for re-election during 
the years surveyed. The average number o f incumbents running for state and 
national offices increases to 77% during presidential election years, but that 
figure is ofteet by incumbents campaigning fo r only 53% of the races in off-year 
elections. While the number o f incumbents campaigning for state and national 
offices during presidential election years has increased sharply in 1984 to 100% 
and 1992 to 83%, these increases have been followed by decreases to the level 
of 60% in 1980,1988 and 1996. The trend fo r state and national incumbents 
during off-year elections has increased from 36% in 1982 to 70% in 1994. The 
lowest number o f incumbents campaigning for state and national offices in 
Nevada occurred in 1982 when incumbents were featured in only 36% of the 
races on the ballot. The highest percentage occurred in 1976 and 1984 when
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, eleven members of the Board of Regents, eleven 
members of the State Board of Education, and ferty-one district judges.
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every state and national office in Nevada featured an incumbent running for re- 
election.
A t the local level, an average o f 41% of the races on the ballot featured an 
incumbent running for re-election. The average increased to 48% when 
presidential election years were isolated from the other data and dropped to 33% 
when only off-year elections were considered. The percentage of local races 
featuring an incumbent during the presidential election years surveyed increased 
from a low o f 20% during the 1976 election to a high of 69% during the 1984 
election, but these increases were followed by a decrease to 36% in 1988 and a 
recovery back to 68% in 1996. The number of local incumbents campaigning in 
off-year elections increased from a low of 6% in 1982 to a high of 68% in 1990, 
then decreased sharply to 18% in 1994.
Despite the high percentages o f re-election attempts captured in Figure 7, 
the numbers are lower than expected due to the creation o f new local offices 
during almost every election year surveyed. The increase in local officials 
reflects the growing number o f Nevada residents, but more offices do not ensure 
more effective representation. Most o f the new local offices featured races that 
were not competitive because there was only one candidate campaigning fo r the 
new position. To make matters worse, the candidate who was campaigning for 
the new local office was often unknown to the mass public.
“None o f these candidates” is useful during elections where there is either 
no opposing candidate or no candidate that is known to voters on the ba llo t In 
cases where candidates are running unopposed, “none o f the above” offers
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automatic opposition. Voting for an unknown politician is very risky considering 
the amount o f responsibility that we entrust to public office holders. When the 
candidates running for a particular office on the ballot are unknown to the voters, 
“none o f these candidates” offers an incentive for candidates to make their name 
known to the public. Encouraging voters to choose “none of these candidates” 
when they lack political knowledge of every candidate on the ballot is beneficial 
to the electoral process because it shifts responsibility fo r providing information 
about the issues of the campaign from the public back to the candidate. 
Threatening candidates with “none of the above” votes gives the candidate an 
incentive to address issues in the campaign and make his message readily 
available to potential voters. Even candidates in uncontested races would have 
to address issues in their campaign to avoid losing to “none o f the above” on 
Election Day. “None o f these candidates” would ensure that citizens are given a 
choice in these local races. With a binding “none of these candidates” law there 
is hope that elections could become more focused on issues that constituents 
care about and less focused on thirty second soundbites that convey very little 
information.
Figure 8̂ ® portrays the percentage o f victorious incumbents in any given 
election year from 1976 through 1996. While state and national candidates are 
more likely to run for reelection according to Rgure 7, they are not more likely to 
win their reelection attempt when compared to local officials in Rgure 8. The 
odds of an incumbent victory are good regardless of the level o f govemment that 
the candidate is campaigning to serve in. In 1976 and 1986 every incumbent
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running was reelected. According to the data presented in Figure 10, every 
incumbent seeking statewide office was reelected in 1976,1978,1986,1990 and
1996. One hundred percent o f the local officials running in 1976,1982,1986, 
1992 and 1994 also won re-election.
Figure 8. Percentage o f Incumbent Victories
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Calculations for Figure 8 were obtained by dividing the total number o f 
incumbents on the ballot by the number o f candidates who won the election. 
Figure 9 reflects the total number o f incumbents on the ballot, while Figure 10 
reflects the number o f incumbents who were successful in winning their re- 
election campaigns. W hile Figure 7 shows that incumbents are more likely to run 
for re-election during presidential election years. Figure 10 shows that 
incumbents are more likely to win their re-election attempts during off-year
13 Ibid., 313-329.
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elections. Incumbents are 5% more likely to win at the state and national level 
and 9% more likely to win at the local level during an off-year election. On 
average, the incumbent has an 85% probability that he w ill be re-elected 
regardless o f the level o f govemment that he is seeking office in. The 
incumbency retention rate for state and nationai offices in Nevada is 82% during 
a presidential election year and 87% during an off-year election. At the local 
level, incumbents face an 86% incumbent retention rate during presidential 
election years and a 95% retention rate during off-year elections. The data for all 
of Nevada's elected offices ranges from 57% of incumbents winning their re- 
election attempts in 1988 to 100% of incumbents winning re-election in 1976 and 
1986.
“None of the above” forces incumbents to run competitive, informative 
elections that benefit all o f society. Voters who are dissatisfied with govemment 
often view the current incumbent retention rate as evidence that their vote would 
not be effective in removing that candidate from public office. “None o f these 
candidates” gives these voters the opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with 
incumbents even if they cannot amass enough votes to have the incumbent 
thrown out o f office. If a special election were held because an incumbent lost to 
“none o f these candidates,” it could go a long way towards improving political 
efficacy among the mass public and encouraging disenchanted voters to show 
up at the polls.
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Money
The sources behind generous campaign contributions act to intensify the 
dissatisfaction o f voters with incumbent officials. Increasing contributions from 
special interests can lead to less consideration for constituent needs. Special 
interests view campaign contributions as an investment. The group contributes 
money to the candidate's campaign out of the hope that the candidate, once in 
office, will act as an advocate fo r the group by voting down legislation offensive 
to the group and possibly sponsoring legislation in the group's interest. This 
system of indirect quid pro quo acts as one causal effect in the degenerating 
relationship between citizens and politicians. Candidates noble enough to resist 
special interests w ill be so underfunded that they have no real chance of winning 
the election. At the same time, candidates who sell out to the highest special 
interest bidders are reelected to carry out favors for organized interests to the 
detriment of the people at large. According to a Common Cause study of the 
1992 election, “349 incumbent members o f the House o f Representatives 
received nearly ten times more contributions from political action committees 
than their opponents" (Miller, 1994).̂ "̂  While 24 of the 349 challengers were 
successful in defeating the incumbent, “325 or 93% of the incumbents were 
returned to office, some owing more than half o f their success to special 
interests” (Miller, 1994).̂ ^ “As candidates rely more and more on major 
contributors and PACs,” M iller contends, “voters feet more distanced from the
Miller, par. 5. 
"  Ibid.
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decision-making process" (1994).'*® The distance is caused by voters feeling that 
“the big decisions have already been made by the big money interests before 
candidates' names even appear on the ballot and that whoever is elected is so 
behoiden to those interests that the voice of ‘the little guy* w ill not be heard”
(1994)J^ NOTA advocates like Tony M iller are confident that “a victory fo r 'None 
of the Above' would send a very strong message to officeholders, candidates and 
campaigners tha t. . .  if  s time for a change, time to listen to the voters, not the 
consuitants; time to consider the public interest, not their own political interests” 
(1994).''®
Money is an easy target because the cost o f running a successful 
campaign has skyrocketed. Statistics show that it costs almost half a million 
dollars to run a successful campaign for a seat in the House of Representatives. 
Statistics also show that the candidate with the most money w ill win the election 
most o f the time. Incumbents get more political contributions than do their 
competitors; thus, the increase in the amount of money available to incumbents 
accounts fo r their high retention rates. According to Common Cause, only five 
percent o f U.S. House races were “financially competitive” in 1990 (Hoover, 
1993).̂ ®
16 Ibid., par. 8.
"  Ibid.
Ibid., par. 9. 
Hoover, par. 4.
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It is not surprising that these statistics reflecting the impact of money on 
political campaigns would contribute to a decline in the feeling that a person’s 
vote matters. The one man, one vote strategy handed down by the Supreme 
Court in Baker v. Canf® has been diluted by the ruling in Bucklev v. Valeo^  ̂that 
political spending is the equivalent of political speech. Money is actually more 
effective than speech when it comes to influence over the politicai process. 
According to Winders, money contributed to the decline in party mobilization 
more than any other factor (1999).^ Political parties have focused on fundraising 
rather than mobilization because it is a more efficient way o f winning an election. 
Winders claims that PACs have “iimited policy options and outcomes by 
increasing their influence over the two major political parties" (1999).“  Winders 
concludes that “political parties have become more reliant on money than on 
organization, and mobilizing voters has become secondary (at best) to 
fundraising" (1999).̂ ^
A significant portion o f the money raised during a campaign is spent on 
negative advertisements. Negative campaign advertisements rely on name- 
calling and mudslinging to get their messages across. The purpose of a 
campaign advertisement is to manipulate a political issue into a one-sided sound
“  Bakery. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21 Bucklev V. Vafeo. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
^  Bill Winders, The Roller Coaster of Class Conflict Class Segments, Mass 
Mobilization, and Voter Turnout in the U.S., 1840-1996“ in Social Forces 77, no. 3 (March 1999): 
852-
“  Ibid., 853-854.
”  Ibid., 853.
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bite powerful enough to persuade voters in flavor o f the candidate sponsoring the 
advertisement. A thirty-second sound bite w ill never tell you the whole story; 
these sound bites often rely on a voter’s ignorance about what has not been said 
to persuade them. Voters remember the advertisements when they go to the 
polis, but the average voter is not given enough information in these commercials 
to differentiate flactfrom fiction. The bitter irony is that campaign advertisements 
are created to intentionally confuse voters by manipulating the facts and making 
It appear that the other candidate has done something wrong. Campaign 
consultants boast that the best campaign advertisements have a grain of truth to 
them, but they never mention the number o f lies that they extol. Politicians hope 
that voters will believe their lies and vote based on them. They conduct polling to 
figure out which lies are most believable and they continue to use these tactics in 
every election year.
interest groups and PACs often use their contributions to pay for 
advertisements attacking a candidate’s opponent even though surveys show that 
negative advertisements demobilize the electorate. With NOTA in the picture, 
candidates have an incentive not to show negative advertisements because 
NOTA offers voters an alternative to voting fo r the candidates engaging in 
mudslinging. The cost o f financing another candidate in the special election 
coupled with a decline in the incumbency advantage would make monetary 
campaign contributions less efficient mechanisms for influencing policy under a 
binding NOTA system. Candidates would be forced to use real issues to get 
their name out to the public. NOTA would also help third party candidates who
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cannot raise money like Republicans and Democrats. Everyone would enter the 
special election on equal footing. The time constraints between the general 
election and the special election would hamper party efforts to collect large cash 
reserves. “Moneyed interests might not invest so heavily in incumbents if their 
longevity was no longer guaranteed," asserts Hoover (1993).“  Less negative 
advertising would foster campaigns based on the issues. NOTA would shift the 
candidate’s focus from monetary contributions back to mobilizing the electorate. 
A t the same time, NOTA would make it easier for citizens to gain accurate 
political knowledge.
A system controlled by special interests and elites can not be considered
democratic. According to Ralph Nader
Nothing is more costly than unchallenged control o f nominations 
and elections by what Thomas Jefferson calied the 'monied 
interests.’ When Thomas Jefferson saw the purpose of 
representative govemment as counteracting the excesses o f the 
monied interests,’ he was recognizing that democracy’s central 
point is to work on the maldistribution of power and make it more 
susceptible to reordering, challenge, displacement and where 
particularly extreme, being outlawed. American history has marked 
this progress by abolishing slavery and expanding the franchise to 
include women and minorities. (NOTA: Cutting the Big Boys Down 
to Size," 1996)“
Elected officials are obligated to take the wishes o f their constituents into account 
if the process is to be considered democratic. Voting is merely symbolic if  it does 
not determine how a candidate w ill behave while in office. Rule by the people
“  Hoover, par. 6.
^  Ralph Nader, “NOTA: Cutting the Big Boys Down to Ske," In Policy Insights, par. 12, 
16,17 [online Joumai] vol. 806 (May 1996 [cited 10 February 1999D; available from World Wide 
Web @ http://www.nota.ora/Di806.htmr
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requires that voting must serve as a tool fo r enforcing accountability among
elected officials. “None o f these candidates” forces incumbents to address the
demands o f their constituents because it offers voters a viable altemative to
elections traditionally dominated by career Democrats and Republicans.
According to Professor Amy:
The basic purpose of elections in the United States is to produce 
legislative bodies that reflect the w ill of the people. [This] notion. . .  
is central to most Americans conception of democracy. We believe 
that the more representative such a body is, the more likely it is to 
pass laws that embody the views o f the public—which is much of 
what democratic govemment is all about. . .  The more 
representative the legislature the more democratic the election 
system. . .  John Adams argued that legislatures in the United 
States "should be an exact portrait, in miniature, o f the people at 
large, as it should think, feel, reason, and act like them. . .  Our 
voting system consistently violates this basic democratic principle; it 
often produces legislatures that flail to accurately m irror the political 
preferences o f the public (1993).̂ ^
Representation occurs when policies change because of the w ill o f the
electorate. Since little representation actually takes place, those who disagree
with the policies supported by the two major parties never have a real chance to
see their opinions shape policies. If we want elections to act as tools of
accountability, voters must be given the opportunity punish candidates who have
broken campaign promises and betrayed the public trust. NOTA supplies voters
with that opportunity when there is no opponent present or when the opponent is
too weak to provide any real challenge against the incumbent. Professor Pitney
suggests that, “if  previoiusly unopposed incumbents started losing 20% or 30%
of the vote to NOTA, they would be foolish not to reexamine what they were
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doing wrong," especially since, “a large NOTA vote would serve as an 
unmistakeable sign o f incumbent vulnerability, thereby drawing strong 
challengers into the next race" (Pitney, “The Right to Vote No," 1994) “  
“Politicians wouid fear the ultimate humiliation of losing an election to 'none of the 
above' and they would do anything in their power to avoid such a defeat," asserts 
Pitney (Right to Vote No, 1994) “  Fear o f losing to NOTA may prompt politicians 
to be more responsive to their constituents. Politicians would be forced to 
consider the fact that a high percentage o f “none of the above" votes would act 
as a signal for better qualified challengers to enter the race against the 
incumbent in the next election. NOTA would increase the chances of putting 
representatives who are trustworthy in office by decreasing the role of money 
and increasing the role o f accountability in the political system.
^  Douglas Amy, Real Choicest New Voices: The Case for Prooortfonat Representation 
Elections in the United States (New York: Columbia UnNersity Press, 1993), 27.
28 IPitney, The Right to Vote No," par. 13. 
“  Ibid., par. 17.
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CHAPTER 4
ADOPTION PROCEDURES 
In 1916, progressive Senator Robert Lafollette asserted that the people 
should decide whether their nation should go to war instead of allowing the 
govemment to make a decision o f such great consequence. Lafollette’s plan 
called for a national “war referendum” where the people would be able to change 
the law through the process o f signing petitions and voting on the issue in a 
federal election (Walsh and Kulman, 1996).̂  While Lafollette may have won a 
few battles over the national “war referendum," he certainly failed to win the war 
because a national referendum was never enacted. Lafollette’s crusade is 
relevant in the battle to get a binding form o f “none of these candidates” on the 
ballot because any measure, other than the adoption of federal legislation 
mandating NOTA in all elections, would have to be adopted at the state level. 
The consequence of state action is that the battle to get a binding “none of these 
candidates” on the ballot would have to be waged separately in all fifty states. 
The problem fo r NOTA advocates would be that only twenty^seven states 
currently allow citizens to enact legislation through the initiative or popular 
referendum processes, but every state except Delaware has a mechanism in
' Kenneth T. Wafsh and Linda Kulman, ‘Bigfbotihg in Gucct Loafers: Let's Have the Voters do 
more Lawmaking at the Ballot Box" in U.S. News&Worid Report oar. 1 idnline ioumafl vol. 121 (Decemiier 
30,1996); avaiiabte from Wilson Select @ http:/Air8tsearch.ocfc.orQ
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place allowing citizens to vote for changes to the state constitution (Magelby,
1998).̂  While the lack o f a national referendum makes the battle for the adoption 
of a binding “none o f these candidates” law more difficult, it does not make the 
battle impossible to win. Often, when an initiative or referendum is passed by 
one state, media coverage o f the issue compels other states to enact sim ilar laws 
(Magleby, 1998).®
Four years prior to Lafollette’s crusade for a “war referendum,” the Nevada 
constitution was amended to allow citizens to directly initiate legislation (Heller, 
1997).’* While the 1912 amendment promoted direct democracy by allowing 
citizens to make laws, several safeguards were put into place to ensure that only 
the most worthy initiatives would actually become law. The amendment required 
ten percent o f the voters in thirteen o f Nevada’s seventeen counties to sign a 
petition to put the issue on the ballot If the required signatures were obtained, 
the initiative would appear on the ballot in the next two general elections. The 
initiative would not become law unless it was approved by a majority of the voters 
In both elections. Between 1950 and 1997 sixty-five constitutional amendments 
succeeded in the petition phase of the initiative, but W ed to secure majority 
approval in one or both o f the next two elections.® Fifty-five initiatives that did not 
require constitutional amendment appeared on the ballot in the same time
 ̂ David B. Magleby, ‘Ballot Initiatives and Intergovernmental Regulations in the United States,* in 
Publius, par. 1 [electronic jOumall (Winter 1998 [cited 23 February 2000]); available from Wilson Select @ 
http://firstsearch.oclc.ora
® Ibid., par. 4.
*  Dean Heller, The Political History of Nevada 1996 (Carson City: SPO, 1997), 83,95.
® Ibid.. 83.
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frame.® Nevada's constitution allows citizens to change existing laws through the 
referendum process, which has similar requirements.
Initiative and referendum are the methods that would gamer the most 
success in enacting a binding “none of these candidates” law. While it may be 
possible to get binding NOTA passed through the legislature, it is unlikely that 
such an attempt would be successful. Legislative adoption would require NOTA 
advocates to convince the legislature to undercut their own legislative authority 
and reduce their reelection potential by enacting NOTA. Even if it were possible 
to get the issue passed through the legislature, concessions would probably 
require compromises to be made by NOTA advocates. The initiative and 
referendum processes are superior to adoption by the legislature because they 
allow NOTA proponents to determine the language used in the law and the 
explanation of the issue on the ballot.
The downside o f using the initiative and referendum processes is that 
abuses o f these democratic devices have lead to widespread adoption of 
initiatives and référendums promoted by big businesses and special interests 
instead o f regular citizens. It is ironic that the tools progressive reformers used to 
lim it the power o f special interests—initiatives and référendums—are the same 
tools that special interests have embraced to make policy in the modem era. 
Researchers found that 80 percent o f initiatives that became law in the 1980's 
were won by the side that spent the most money promoting the issue (Mattson,
' Ibid.
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1999)7 Despite the tendency for money to dominate the initiative process, 
“groups of citizens who iack financial power can still organize and get their voices 
heard, and sometimes even change laws” (Mattson, 1999)7
In order to effectively promote the NOTA initiative, advocates should bring 
the issue to the public consciousness for debate. Addressing the issue in a 
variety of forums such as newspaper and magazine editorials, radio and 
television call in shows, letters to public officials, and websites offer cost effective 
grassroots methods for bringing the issue to the attention o f the public.
Organizing citizen groups around the issue and soliciting monetary contributions 
to advertise in the initiative campaign would also be necessary for success in 
adopting a binding “none of these candidates” law. The lack o f monetary support 
behind the “none of these candidates" issue is often blamed forfeited NOTA 
initiatives in Wyoming (1991), Colorado (1993), Michigan (1995), Ohio (1996), 
Pennsylvania (1996), Arizona (1997) and Califomia (1998), but the issue is 
gaining momentum due to increased exposure.
Something must be done to resolve the crisis o f confidence that is brewing 
in the American political system. Citizens must be connected to their 
government so that democracy can function properly. A binding form o f the 
“none of these candidates” law is only one step in the right direction. White 
NOTA may not be enough to solve the turnout problem on its own, it is a step 
toward increasing citizen connectedness and voter participation. NOTA is a
 ̂Kevin Mattson, Taking back the initiattve: Renewing Progressive Democracy* in Soctai Policv. 
par. 2 [online journal] vol. 29 no. 4 (Summer 1999); available from Wilson Select @ htto://firstsearch.ociaoro
* Mattson, par. 4.
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change in our electoral system that could increase partisanship, trust, efficacy, 
and knowledge regarding politics by improving the pooi of candidates holding 
political office and offering these candidates an incentive to reach out to the 
public. While NOTA would change the structure of American elections, the 
change would not be disruptive because voters would be given the option of 
selecting candidates as they do in the status quo or exercising a new privilege by 
selecting NOTA. Nader estimates that “a binding NOTA would pass handily in 
the nearly two dozen states that have initiative and referendum [procedures] 
statewide" (“NOTA: Cutting the Big Boys Down to Size,” 1996).® The most 
serious consequence facing a society that employs NOTA would be the cost o f a 
special election, but the benefits of good govemment clearly outweigh the risks of 
such costs. Experts like Steve Lilienthal say that, “voting for NOTA is an 
expression of the belief that citizens should be able to elect worthy leaders,” 
because, “NOTA empowers voters to demand the best—not simply settle for 
whatever they are given” (Lilienthal, “NOTA Movement,” 1998).*°
NOTA will increase our chances o f putting trustworthy politicians 
back into office by decreasing the role of money and increasing the role of 
accountability in our political system. If we want elections to act as tools to 
enforce accountability, voters must punish candidates who have broken 
campaign promises and betrayed the pubiic trust. Voters cannot punish
® Ralph Nader, ‘NOTA: Cutting the Big Boys Down to Size,' in Policy Insights, par. 9, [online 
Journal] vol. 806 (May 1996 [cited 10 February 1999D; available from World Wide Web @ 
htto:/Awww.nota.ora/bl806.htmf
Steve Lilienthal, "NOTA" Movement Working to Place "None of the Above' Option on the 
Ballots,' par. 5. [Lkd. LPC Monthly February 1998—‘NOTA* Movement] (February 1998 [cited 2 July 1999]); 
available fiom World Wide Web @ httDV/Www.ca.lo.oro/locm/9802-NOTA.htmt
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dishonest politicians when they are forced to choose between two dishonest 
politicians. While it may be rational to choose the lesser o f two evils under the 
circumstances, changes must be made to ensure that voters are not forced to 
make that choice in the future. The first step toward increasing participation is 
giving voters a real choice that makes a real difference. The “none of these 
candidates" law accomplishes that goal.
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FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
1. Why not pass some other type of legislation (campaign finance reform, 
term lim its, etc.) instead of binding NOTA?
Binding NOTA does not have to exist exclusive of these other reforms, but It 
is the only single measure that can address all o f these problems collectively. 
Too many pieces of legislation may overwhelm part time legislators and lead to 
ineffective reform. Passing a binding NOTA resolution could buy the legislature 
time to research whether other reforms would be necessary. Representatives 
may also view binding NOTA as being less controversial than some of these 
other reforms. This may make it easier to push binding NOTA through the 
legislature.
2. Why should we make changes when the system is not broken?
The rising number o f third party and “none of these candidates" votes, the 
decline in voter turnout and increasing cynicism about local politicians suggests 
that there are problems with the political system that need to be addressed. In 
effect, the system is broken and NOTA would be a step toward fixing i t
66
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3. Why not just count non-voters?
Politicians do not take non-voters seriously. Elected officials often assume that 
non-voters are content with the political system or they would show up at the 
polls and try to change things. This assumption is Incorrect. People who are not 
happy with their living situations due to poverty or other Actors usually do not 
vote because they feel that there vote is not meaningful enough to change their 
situation. Thus, non-voting is not an effective mechanism for withholding consent 
from elected officials because it is often misinterpreted as contentment rather 
than dissatisfaction.
4. What is wrong with using unconventional protest to demonstrate voter 
dissatisfaction instead o f adopting NOTA?
It is difficult to organize unconventional protests among non-voters because they 
constitute such a large and diverse portion o f society. Aside from the 
organizational difficulties that non-voters would face in order to bring attention to 
their protest, such protests may be misconstrued as protests against government 
in general, protests against the office in general or protests against only one o f 
several candidates on the ba llo t A  binding “none o f these candidates" law 
eliminates this confusion by allowing voters to clearly express their dissatisfaction 
against a particular slate of candidates in the election. Citizens should not be 
forced to resort to unconventional protest in a democratic system. A binding
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“none of these candidates” option would allow citizens to express their 
dissatis^ction constructively so that a dialogue between citizens and politicians 
can be established in order to solve problems with the political system without 
creating unnecessary upheaval.
5. Why shouldn't NOTA appear on special election ballots?
My decision not to include NOTA on special election ballots is a compromise that 
may be necessary to secure approval from state legislators who are concerned 
with the costs o f numerous special elections. While it is unlikely that citizens 
would choose NOTA over the candidate list in special elections, opponents worry 
that the monetary costs of several special elections would outweigh the benefits 
o f NOTA legislation. Filling the vacant office is less of a concern because the 
Nevada constitution allows the govemor to temporarily appoint someone to fill 
the vacant office until another special election can be held.
6. What if NOTA backfires and increases the amount o f money necessary to 
run a successful campaign?
The argument that NOTA w ill decrease money in political campaigns is based 
on three Actors; the incumbency factor, the surprise ̂ c to r and the timing factor. 
The incumbency ̂ c to r is based on the idea that if  incumbents are not re-elected 
as often in a binding NOTA system, people w ill be less likely to invest so much
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money in their candidacies. The surprise factor relies on the fact that parties will 
not know In advance which races will have a special election or If any special 
elections w ill be held at all. Thus, political parties could either save some of their 
campaign contributions for the special election (if it occurs) or spend all o f their 
money on the first candidate and hope that he does not lose to NOTA. The first 
scenario provides less money involved in most campaigns because most races 
will not require expenses fo r a special election. The second alternative reflects 
the state of political expenditures In the status quo. Either way, we don’t  see 
extra fundraising for the special election. The timing factor reflects that there is 
only one month between the regular election and the special election. One 
month does not give parties much time to raise money and it is likely that these 
campaigns would be characterized less by political advertisements and more by 
media attention drawn by a NOTA victory in the first election.
Since NOTA would make candidates a less marketable investment, it is 
possible that NOTA would decrease candidate contributions and increase party 
building contributions that could be used to market new candidates in the special 
election. Due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo that political 
spending is the equivalent o f political speech, no campaign finance reform 
legislation, other than a constitutional amendment outlawing soft money 
contributions, can guarantee that the money used in political campaigns w ill not 
be filtered over into the soft money category. Since people would be able to 
choose NOTA whenever they lack political information about a list of candidates, 
binding NOTA legislation increases the likelihood that campaign contributions w ill
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be spent fnfomriing citizens about the issues o f the campaign instead o f just 
getting the candidate’s name ou t NOTA will always have more name 
recognition than the other candidates so candidates w ill have to run informative 
campaigns to beat NOTA. If we cannot say that NOTA w ill decrease the amount 
o f money spent in political campaigns, we can still say that It w ill ensure that the 
money spent In political campaigns is better spent to educate the public about 
the candidates. The benefits o f adopting NOTA legislation, even without the 
argument that It decreases campaign spending, would still outweigh these costs.
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